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HALVE THE BABY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a simple and efficient solution to an emerging problem in the law of cyberspace: deciding when the
use as "'Keywords" metatags of other companies' trademarked terms'
should be allowed.
This paper begins by describing what metatags are and how they
work. The article then provides a relatively brief discussion of the aspects of trademark law relevant to the trademark-metatag issue. Next
this paper discusses the apposite cases that have thus far been decided,
paying particular attention to the two most important cases in the field,
Brookfield Communications,Inc. v. West Coast EntertainmentCorp.2 and
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles. 3 After briefly surveying the other academic literature discussing the trademark-metatag issue, this article
proposes a solution to the troubling use of trademarks as metatags.
The ultimate suggestion is that the creation and utilization of a
"Trademarks" metatag should be strongly encouraged. Within the
"Trademarks" metatag, a company would be allowed to list any and all
terms in which it holds trademark rights and none in which it does not.
As a means for encouraging compliance, either Congress could create a
cause of action for any company whose trademarked terms are used as
"Trademark" metatags in sites whose owners do not also hold rights in
those terms, or courts could evaluate the actions of alleged trademark
misusers in light of whether the appropriated terms were listed as
"Keywords" metatags or "Trademarks" metatags, with a much harsher
test presented to defendants who listed others' trademarked terms in
4
their "Trademarks" section.
II.

WHAT ARE METATAGS AND HOW DO THEY WORK?

"Metatags" is a fairly inclusive term that encompasses a number of
different Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) code devices designed to
impart information about the particular web page within which the de1. An illustration of which would be a pornography site completely unaffiliated with
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. listing "Playboy" within the "Keywords" section of its metatags.
See generally Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., 1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va.
1998), discussed infra Part IV.D.
2. Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999).
3. Playboy Enter. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (denial of preliminary injunction),
affd without op., 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998); Playboy Enter. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d
1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (summary judgment granted to defendant).
4. The only viable defenses in such a situation would be (1) the defendant has a valid
trademark in the term; and (2) the defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that he
had a valid common law trademark right in the term.

646

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVIII

vices exist. 5 Metatags provide information that does not appear on the
page as displayed to web surfers, though the tags can be seen through
the use of the "view source" option on a browser. 6 Rather the details in
the metatags that explain what a page is "about" are meant to be communicated directly to search engines' "spiders" for indexing purposes.
While there exist a number of different metatags, 7 the specific
metatag this article focuses on is "Keywords." The "Keywords" metatag
is, in its intended, benign form, a tool for communicating to search engines what a specific web page is about, such that the search engines can
then properly index the page for web surfers relying on search engines to
tell them what is where in cyberspace. 8
For example, a web page that contained nothing but Hamlet's "To
be, or not to be" soliloquy might contain these metatags:
<META NAME = "Keywords" CONTENT = "Hamlet, Shakespeare,
Shakespear, Shakspeare, Shakspear, Bard, William, Soliloquy, Suicide,
Tragedy, Globe">
Note that none of the keywords would actually appear on the visible
page displaying the soliloquy, but all would help a search engine, to a
greater or lesser extent, properly place the page in an index of Internet
sites. The end result would be that a web surfer looking for the text of
Hamlet's famous soliloquy would be able to go to a search engine's site,
type in, for example, "Hamlet, Soliloquy, Shakespear," and have a link to
the "To be, or not to be" page show up near the top of the results list
returned by the search engine.
More troubling, and the focus of this paper is what happens when
the same site contains metatags such as these:
<META NAME = "Keywords" CONTENT = "Hamlet, Shakespeare,
Shakespear, Shakspeare, Shakspear, Bard, William, Soliloquy, Suicide,
Tragedy, Globe, Coke, Pepsi, Nike, Reebok, Playboy, Mercedes, BMW,
5. See Brian Kennan, Diverting Traffic on the Web, 1999 Internet Law & Regulation
Special Report 1, 2-3 (1999). A web page, in fact, is really nothing more than a text file that
includes instructions telling a web browser - like Netscape Navigator or Internet Explorer
- how to display its contents. Id. For the most part, these instructions for the browser are
given in the form of various "tags." Id. Tags tell the browser such things as which text to
display bold - <b> - and which text should be italicized - <i> - as well as what to tell the
various search engine "spiders" that "crawl" through the page what the page is "about." Id.
6. Id. at 3 n.19.
7. See generally Scott Clark, Back to Basics: META Tags, Part 2 (visited Mar. 17,
2000) <http://www.webdeveloper.com/html/html metatags-part2.html>. For example, the
metatag, "Refresh," specifies the time in seconds before the web browser is to reload the
page; "Set-Cookie" is one way of placing a cookie in a web surfer's browser. Id.
8. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (S.D. Cal. 1998),
affd without op., 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that "meta tags are not visible to the
websurfer although some search engines rely on these tags to help websurfers find certain
websites. Much like the subject index of a card catalog, the meta tags give the websurfer
using a search engine a clearer indication of the content of a website.").
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Sony, Panasonic, JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC,
JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC, JVC,">
With "Keywords" like those in this second example, the same "To be,
or not to be" site might show up not only on the results page returned in
response to a search for "Hamlet, Soliloquy, Shakespeare," but also on
the results page returned in response to a search for "JVC." Here, it
would seem that metatags have been misused for the purpose of driving
up traffic to the "To be, or not to be" web site. The question, then, is what
can, or should, be done about it.
III.

TRADEMARK LAW

In this section, the article offers a brief overview of the doctrine and
policy of trademark law.
A.

WHAT ARE TRADEMARKS?

According to the leading commentator in the field, "[u]nder the modem definition of the term 'trademark,' both the common law and federal
law follow the definition set forth in the federal Lanham Act: a trademark is a designation used 'to identify and distinguish' the goods of a
9
person."
Simply put, a trademark is a symbol that allows a consumer to identify the source or sponsor of a particular good or service.10 Trademarks
are useful both in holding producers to appropriate quality standards,"
12
and in allowing consumers to lower their search costs.
B.

WHAT IS THE UNDERLYING POLICY DRIVING TRADEMARK LAW?

The primary purpose that trademark law seeks to address is the
avoidance of consumer confusion as to the source or sponsorship of goods
or services. 13 While this policy is usually effectuated through suits
brought by trademark holders seeking redress for the unconsented-to
use of their trademarks by third parties, the "rights" of these trademark
holders are best understood as a means to keep consumer confusion at
9. See J. THoMAs

MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 3.01 (4th ed.) (quoting Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (1996) ("Trademark")).
10. Id. § 2.03.
11. Id. § 2.04. "Trademarks fix responsibility. Without marks, a seller's mistakes or
low quality products would be untraceable to their source. Therefore, trademarks create
an incentive to keep up a good reputation for a predictable quality of goods." Id.
12. Id. § 2.05. "Another important economic function of trademarks is that they reduce
the customer's cost of collecting information about products." Id.
13. Id. § 2.01. "The interest of the public in not being deceived has been called the
basic policy [of trademark law]." Id.
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bay rather than as ends sought for their own worth.14 Justice O'Connor
has made clear the proper focus of trademark law:
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of
deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion
as to source. While that concern may result in the creation of "quasiproperty rights" in communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the protection of producers as an incentive to
15
product innovation.
C.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

Trademark infringement is considered a commercial tort. 16 At the
17
federal level, infringement is now governed by the Lanham Act.
The basic test for trademark infringement - "likelihood of confusion"
8
- is the same for both common law trademark infringement actions'
14. Id. § 2.06. "Hence, any 'property' in trademarks is created and defined by the
mental state of consumers." Id.
15. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989). See also
International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 94 (1981) ("Atrademark owner has a property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent customer confusion as to who produced the goods and to
facilitate differentiation of the trademark owner's goods."); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.
v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Property" in a trademark is
defined solely by the likelihood of confusion); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater,
Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976), appeal after remand, 572 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1978)
("A 'trademark' is not that which is infringed. What is infringed is the right of the public to
be free of confusion and the synonymous right of a trademark owner to control his product's
reputation.... The trademark laws exist not to 'protect' trademarks, but.., to protect the
consuming public from confusion, concomitantly protecting the trademark owner's right to
a non-confused public."); Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) ("The rule rests
upon the traditionally accepted premise that the only legally relevant function of a trademark is to impart information as to the source or sponsorship of the product.... The courts
have generally confined legal protection to the trademark's source identification function
for reasons grounded in the public policy favoring a free, competitive economy.").
16. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.02.
17. The Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (2000), reads as follows:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
18. See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1926); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1878).
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and federal trademark infringement actions under the Lanham Act. 9
The precise test for a claim of infringement of a federally registered
mark is whether the defendant's use is "likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive." 20 For a claim of infringement of an unregistered mark, the test is whether the defendant's use "is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association" of the defendant with the holder of the unregistered
21
trademark.
It is important also to note that, for infringement to be found, the
trademark holder must establish that the defendant is using its trademark, as a trademark, in a commercial manner that is likely to cause
consumer confusion and is unmitigated by necessity. 2 2 Non-trademark
uses of others' trademarks - uses which often do not serve to confuse
consumers - are not prohibited by the law of trademark infringement.
However, whether or not such uses are sometimes actionable under
the theory of trademark dilution is a closer question. Trademark in23
fringement and trademark dilution may be alleged in the alternative.
D.

TRADEMARK DILuTION

While "Dilution" is defined in the Lanham Act, 2 4 the gloss applied by
courts and commentators is more important here than with respect to
infringement. Professor McCarthy offer a clear and concise explanation
of the basics of trademark dilution:
The dilution theory grants protection to strong, well-recognized marks
even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion, if defendant's use is
such as to diminish or dilute the strong identification value of the plaintiffs mark even while not confusing customers as to source, sponsorship, affiliation or connection. The underlying rationale of the dilution
19. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Winship Green
Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1996) ("likelihood of confusion often is the dispositive inquiry in a Lanham Act case"); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482
(10th Cir. 1987); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971); David Sherman Corp. v.Heublein, Inc., 340 F.2d 377 (8th
Cir. 1965); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
20. Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000).
21. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
22. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. New America Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306-08
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that newspapers using the "New Kids on the Block" trademark to
describe the subject of pay-to-play polls about the band - polls which were in no way affiliated with or licensed by the band - being conducted via 1-900 numbers were protected fair
uses of the New Kids' trademark).
23. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 24.90.
24. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining "Dilution"):
The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of
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doctrine is that a gradual attenuation or whittling away of the value of
a trademark, resulting from use by another, constitutes an invasion of
the senior user's property right
in its mark and gives rise to an in25
dependent commercial tort.
Prior to 1996, dilution was governed solely by state law, as federal
law did not recognize the doctrine. 26 In 1996, however, Congress
27
amended the Lanham Act to include an anti-dilution cause of action.
Courts have traditionally held that trademark dilution can occur via
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
25. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 24.70.
26. Id. § 24.83; see also id. § 24:67.
27. The Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. §1125(c)(1) (2000). reads as follows:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against
another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark
shall be entitled only to injunctive relief unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause
dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the
famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 35(a) and
36, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity.
(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that is
brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State and that
seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of
advertisement.
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner
of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
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either "blurring" or "tarnishment."2 s More recently, the possibility of di29
lution by "elimination" has been recognized.
It should be noted that while McCarthy argues that the non-trademark use of a mark can never serve to dilute the mark,30 this issue is
still subject to some dispute. 3 1 It is also important to keep in mind that
32
in order to qualify for dilution protection, the mark must be strong.
The article now offers a brief explanation of each of the three forms
trademark dilution can take.
1.

Blurring

"Blurring" is the classic form of trademark dilution. The compelling
principle is that if customers - or potential customers - see a famous
mark being used to identify sources on a number of different goods and/
or services, "[tihe unique and distinctive significance of the mark to identify and distinguish one source may be diluted and weakened." 33 This is
the case even if "no confusion as to source, sponsorship, affiliation or con34
nection has occurred."
The New York legislature has listed hypothetical examples of
"blurred" trademarks: DuPont Shoes, Buick aspirin, Schlitz varnish, Ko35
dak pianos and Bulova gowns.
2.

Tarnishment

"Tarnishment" occurs when the defendant's unauthorized use of the
plaintiffs mark results in the mark being degraded or its distinctive
28. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 24.67.
29. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998), discussed infra
Part III.D.3.
30. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 24.103. "There is no dilution of the trademark meaning
of plaintiffs word mark if the defendant is not using the word as a trademark .... When
defendant does not use the word in a trademark sense, then the required novel association
with a 'new and different source' cannot occur. Thus, only trademark-type uses can dilute
the unique link between plaintiffs word mark and plaintiff as a commercial source." Id.
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(2), cmt. i (1995) ("Nontrademark uses, because they do not create an association with a different user's goods,
services or business, are unlikely to dilute the distinctiveness of a mark.") (emphasis added); Cf Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding
that the use of"Spa'am" as name of character in puppet movie does not dilute SPAM meat
product mark because use as a character name is not a trademark use: "[Defendant] is not
using the name 'Spa'am' as a product brand name.... This tends to dissipate the fear that
SPAM will no longer be considered a unique product identifier.").
32. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 24.109.
33. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 24.68.
34. Id.
35. See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983); see also
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989).
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36

quality diluted.
The most famous - and quite illustrative - example of dilution by
tarnishment is the "ENJOY COCAINE" case. 37 In that case, the defendant was enjoined from selling posters reading "ENJOY COCAINE" in a
color and script identical to that used by Coca-Cola.
Trademark dilution by tarnishment has also been recognized, in the
"Candyland" case, 38 in the Internet domain name context. In that case,
the court found that a pornography site located at www.candyland.com
tarnished Hasbro's trademark "Candyland," which is the name of a children's board game.
As these two examples illustrate, "tarnishment" is most viable when
the plaintiffs mark is both strong and "wholesome," and the defendant's
use of the mark is to promote a vice.
3. Elimination
"Elimination" is a recent, judge-made hybrid which first saw use in
the district court opinion of a "cybersquatter" case. 39 In Panavision,the
entrepreneurial Dennis Toeppen eliminated Panavision's ability to use
its corporate name as its domain name when he registered
www.panavision.com. 40 This action diluted Panavision's "Panavision"
41
mark by effectively eliminating it from one medium of communication.
At this point it seems likely that "elimination" cases will be confined
to Internet domain name, "cybersquatter" / "cyberpirate" controversies.
E.

DEFENSES AVAILABLE IN TRADEMARK ACTIONS

Section 33(a) of the Lanham Act provides that even if a mark is registered, use by a non-holder may be allowable according to, inter alia, the
provisions set forth in Section 33(a).4 2 A broad range of defenses to
36. See, e.g., Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960,965 (6th Cir.
1987) (defining dilution as a use that causes a "gradual diminution in the mark's distinctiveness, effectiveness and, hence, value. This kind of infringement corrodes the senior
user's interest in the trademark by blurring its product identification or by damaging positive associations that have attached to it.") (case remanded for consideration of an Ohio
common law dilution charge).
37. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
38. Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (W.D.
Wash. 1996).
39. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 141
F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
40. Id. at 1304.
41. Id.
42. Lanham Act § 33(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2000) reads as follows:
Any registration issued under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20,
1905, or of a mark registered on the principal register provided by this Chapter
and owned by a party to an action shall be admissible in evidence and shall be
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trademark actions is set forth in Section 33(b). 4 3
44
Of these defenses, the most important for this paper are Fair Use
prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration
of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the
goods or services specified in the registration subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein, but shall not preclude anotherperson from proving any legal
or equitable defense or defect, including those set forth in subsection (b), of this
section which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered.
Id. (emphasis added)
43. The Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. §1115(b) (2000), reads as follows:
To the extent that the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable under section 1065 of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of
the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the
registered mark in commerce. Such conclusive evidence shall relate to the exclusive right to use the mark on or in connection with the goods or services specified
in the affidavit filed under the provisions of section 1065 of this title, or in the
renewal application filed under the provisions of section 1059 of this title if the
goods or services specified in the renewal are fewer in number, subject to any conditions or limitations in the registration or in such affidavit or renewal application.
Such conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark shall be subject to
proof of infringement as defined in section 32, and shall be subject to the following
defenses or defects:
(1) That the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained fraudulently; or
(2) That the mark has been abandoned by the registrant; or
(3) That the registered mark is being used, by or with the permission of the
registrant or a person in privity with the registrant, so as to misrepresent the
source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used; or
(4) That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a
use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business,
or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or
device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin; or
(5) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was
adopted without knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been continuously
used by such party or those in privity with him from a date prior to (A) the date of
constructive use of the mark established pursuant to section 7(c), (B) the registration of the mark under this Act if the application for registration is filed before the
effective date of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, or (C) publication of the
registered mark under subsection (c) of section 12 of this Act: Provided, however,
That this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in which such continuous
prior use is proved; or
(6) That the mark whose use is charged as an infringement was registered and
used prior to the registration under this Act or publication under subsection (c) of
section 12 of this Act of the registered mark of the registrant, and not abandoned:
Provided, however, That this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in
which the mark was used prior to such registration or such publication of the registrant's mark; or
(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the
United States; or
(8) That the mark is functional, or
(9) That equitable principles, including laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, are
applicable. (emphases added).
44. See 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) (2000).
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and Functionality. 4 5 Fair Use comes into play when a trademark is being used for a non-trademark function 46 or when the use of the trademark is necessary for descriptive purposes. Functionality is generally
invoked when the physical structure of the trademark serves some utilitarian, non-source-identifying purpose.

F. LICENSING
Finally, it is important to note that a trademark holder can gener47
ally license the use of his trademark to others.
IV.

CASE LAW

Given that metatags have only been used since the advent of Internet search engines has made them useful, it is hardly surprising that
the case law considering their alleged improper use is still quite scant.
There have been enough cases decided, though, for a clear pattern of
holdings to have emerged: except in the most rare of situations, 48 the
trademark holder will win at least an injunction when bringing suit
against another company for the use of its trademarked terms in the
other company's metatags.
Unfortunately, the leading case on the topic is Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.4 9 Judge O'Scannlain's
analysis in Brookfield is choked by formalism and distorted by
O'Scannlain's imperfect understanding of how Internet search engines
function. This article strongly suggests that, even if the proposals made
in this paper are never effectuated, other Circuits decline to follow the
"initial interest confusion" path Judge O'Scannlain has charted for the
Ninth.
Welles is the other major case of the first wave of trademark-metatag
decisions and the reasoning employed therein by Judge Keep offers hope
for the adaptation of trademark law to the Internet even in the absence
of congressional or industry action. Though it is only a second-best solution for the reasons explained in this paper, Welles does provide a far
better model for judicial action than does Brookfield.
45. See 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(8) (2000).
46. See 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000).
47. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 3.04.
48. So far, in fact, "most rare" might be an understatement and "unique" more appropriate. For a detailed description of Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098
(S.D. Cal. 1998) (preliminary injunction denied), affd without op., 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.
1998); 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (summary judgment granted to defendant), the
only case to date in which a trademark holder has lost in an action brought over the use of
its trademarks as metatags by another party, see infra Part IV.F.
49. Brookfield v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). See
infra Part W.E.
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With the exception of SNA, Inc. v. Array,50 which is held aside until
last because it is something of an outlier, the cases discussed in this section are presented in chronological order.
A.

ZNSTITUFORM TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v NATIONAL
ENVIROTECH GROUP,

LLC

In Instituform Technologies, Inc. v. National Envirotech Group,
LLC,5 1 the plaintiff, an industrial plumbing supplier, brought a motion
for a preliminary injunction against a competitor claiming that the defendant was using the plaintiffs federally registered marks "Instituform"
and "Institupipe" in the metatags of the defendant's web site. The parties stipulated to a permanent injunction barring the defendant from using the plaintiffs marks as metatags in any web site. The defendant
agreed to remove the metatags, notify search engines of the injunction,
submit its web pages sans infringing metatags to the search engines for
re-indexing, and file a report certifying its compliance with the
injunction.
Because this matter ended in a stipulated order, the court never
passed on the legality of National Envirotech's metatag use of Instituform's trademarks.

B. OPPEDAHL & LARSON v. ADVANCED CONCEPTS
In Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts,52 a patent law firm
brought suit against a company that listed "Oppedahl" and "Larson"
multiple times in the metatags of each of its web pages despite never
actually referencing the firm in the text of its site. The parties stipulated
to an injunction permanently forbidding the defendants from using the
plaintiffs mark "Oppedahl & Larson" or either of the words "Oppedahl"
and "Larson" in the defendant's web pages without the authorization of
the plaintiff.
As in Instituform, the court's grant of the parties' Joint Motion for
Entry of Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction meant that the
court never passed on the legality of Advanced Concepts' use of Oppedahl
& Larson's trademark or names.

C.

PLAYBOY ENTERS., INC. v. CALVIN DESIGNER LABEL

Playboy Enterprises, Incorporated (PEI) has long been at the forefront of the rush of trademark holders to protect their trademarks from
unscrupulous use on the Internet. This is more likely attributable to the
50. SSA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999). See infra Part IV.J.
51. Civ. Action No. 97-2064 (E.D. La. consent judgment entered August 27, 1997).
52. Civ. Action No. 97-Z-1592 (D. Colo. consent judgment entered December 19, 1997).
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relative commercial value of PEI's marks as metatags than to any superlitigious nature of PEI. 53 PEI's suit against Calvin Designer Label was
the second that PEI filed alleging that its trademarks had been infringed
through others' use of them as metatags, and the first in which a ruling
on the issue came down.
In its suit against Calvin Designer Label, PEI alleged that its trademarks were being infringed, diluted, and counterfeited by the defendant's use of the URLs www.playmatelive.com and www.playboyxxx.com,
and by the placement of "Playboy" and "Playmate" within the
"Keywords" metatags embedded in those sites. In Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Calvin DesignerLabel, 985 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1997), PEI won a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendant from, inter alia,
"using in any manner of the PLAYMATE or PLAYBOY trademarks...
in buried code or metatags on their home page or Web pages." 54 In Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal.
1997), PEI won an identical preliminary injunction. In Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 1999 WL 329058 (N.D. Cal. 1999), PEI
won summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Because the defendant in this case was using infringing domain
names as well as PEI's trademarks in its metatags, this decision should
not be considered a pure "metatag holding."

D.

PLAYBOY

ENTERS., INc. V. AslAFocus INy'L, INC.

PEI's suit against AsiaFocus International, Inc. 55 was the first legal
action taken by the company to protect its trademarks from
cyberpoachers. PEI alleged that AsiaFocus was infringing and diluting
PEI's trademarks through its use of the URLs www.asian-playmates.com and www.playmates-asian.com, and its placement of "Play53. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 687 F.2d 563, 566-67 (finding the "Playboy" mark to be distinctive, widely recognized, and of great value). "Playboy"
is almost assuredly the strongest and most valuable mark within the pornography industry, though "playmate" is possibly not far behind. Cf. id. See also Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d
1098, 1102 (noting that "[tihe term Playboy has gained widespread public recognition and
is distinctive due in large part to the long-standing success and popularity of Playboy magazine and related publications from PEI."). The pornography industry was the first - and is
still one of the few -to realize significant and wide-spread direct commercial gains from the
Internet. The ability of pornographers to sell their very product instantaneously via the
Internet eliminates the order-fulfillment hurdles facing practically every other "Webbased" business. The combination of quick money to be made and one dominant, potentialcustomer attracting, mark meant that PEI had more to lose than any other company by not
rushing to the courthouse.
54. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 (N.D. Cal
1999).
55. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., 1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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boy" and "Playmate" within the "Keywords" metatags embedded in those
sites.
The defendants in this case were all based in Hong Kong, and all
failed to answer the charges brought against them.
Reasoning that:
The defendants have purposefully employed deceptive tactics to attract consumers to their Web site[s] under the guise that their sites are
sponsored by or somehow affiliated with PEI. Specifically, the defendants embedded PEI's trademarks "playboy" and "playmate" within the
Web sites' computer source code which is visible to "search engines"
that look for Web sites containing specific words or phrases specified by
computer users ....
Thus, a consumer conducting a search for PEI's
Web site by typing in the trademark "Playboy" or "Playmate" would receive a search engine-generated list which included the asian-playmates Web site.
the court found the defendants' actions to be willful, and entered a default judgment in PEI's favor "in the amount of $3,000,000 plus costs
56
and, upon tender of supporting affidavit, reasonable attorneys' fees."
Given the scant likelihood that PEI will be able to collect damages
from a Hong Kong-based Internet company, it seems quite plausible that
the three-million-dollar award was meant more to send a message than
to make PEI whole or to punish AsiaFocus.
E. NIZow

CORP. v RADIATION MONITORING DEvicEs, INC.

The facts of Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc.,57 are
a little unusual for trademark infringement via metatags cases. Instead
of utilizing just the trademarks of their competitor as metatags, RMD
lifted Niton's entire meta descriptions and pasted them directly into
RMD's pages. 58
Not surprisingly, RMD was preliminarily enjoined from continuing
this practice or adopting any other that would cause confusion among
web users as to the identity of RMD and/or Niton.5 9

F.

PLAYBOY ENTERS. INT"L, INC.

v.

GLOBAL SITE DESIGNS, INC.

Playboy Enters. Int'l, Inc. v. Global Site Designs, Inc.,60 presents a
familiar fact pattern. In this case the URLs utilized by the defendants in
56. Id. at *1.
57. Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass.
1998).
58. Id. at 104. "[Tlhe 'META' descriptions of RMD's web sites were identical to those
[ofi the Niton web site." Id.
59. Id. at 105.
60. See Playboy Enters. Int'l, Inc. v. Global Site Designs, Inc., 1999 WL 311707 (S.D.
Fla. 1999).
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their effort to cash in on the notoriety of PEI's marks were
www.playboyonline.net and www.playmatesearch.net.
The defendants were preliminarily enjoined from, inter alia, "[u]sing
in any manner the PLAYBOY, PLAYMATE or RABBIT HEAD design
trademarks, and any other term or terms likely to cause confusion therewith . .. in buried code or meta tags on their home page or Web
pages... "61

G.

ERO

rFIELD COMMUNICATIONS,

INC. v. WEST COAST

ENTERTAINMENT CORP.

In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
Corp.,6 2 Judge O'Scannlain carefully separated the trademarks-asmetatags issue from the other questions presented by the case and dealt
with it in great depth. This conscientious approach to considering a cutting-edge problem by a respected jurist turned out to be unfortunate for
two reasons: first, O'Scannlain's fundamental misunderstanding about
how Internet search engines operate led him to the wrong result in
Brookfield; second, O'Scannlain's stature in the judicial community, combined with his impressive level of inquiry into the issue in this case, has
afforded more weight to his holding in Brookfield than the decision would
otherwise merit.
The importance of Brookfield to the current state of the law dictates
that the case be presented in some detail here.
The case came before the Ninth Circuit on plaintiff Brookfield's appeal from the district court's denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendant West Coast "from using in commerce
63
terms confusingly similar to Brookfield's trademark, 'MovieBuff."'
Brookfield gathers data about the entertainment industry and sells
searchable software applications containing this information. 6 4 Brookfield sells a professional-level application, "The Studio System," and a
less extensive consumer-targeted alternative, "MovieBuff."6 5 Brookfield
began using the "MovieBuff' mark around December of 1993.66 Sometime in 1996 or 1997, Brookfield began selling "MovieBuff" online at
www.brookfieldcomm.com and www.moviebuffonline.com, and also began offering customers use of an Internet-based searchable database
under the "MovieBuff' mark at www.inhollywood.com. 6 7 The Patent and
61. Id. at *2.
62. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp, 174 F.3d
1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
63. Id. at 1041.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1041-42.
66. Id. at 1041.
67. Id. at 1042.
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Trademark Office registered Brookfield's "MovieBuff' trademark on September 29, 1998.
West Coast Video is one of the nation's largest video rental store
chains. 68 Since 1991, it has utilized the federally registered service
mark, "The Movie Buffs Movie Store."69 On February 6, 1996, West
Coast Video registered the domain name www.moviebuff.com. 70 On November 11, 1998, "West Coast Video issued a press release announcing
the imminent launch of its web site full of 'movie reviews, Hollywood
news and gossip, provocative commentary, and coverage of the independent film scene and films in production.'" 7 1 The press release further announced that the site would contain "'an extensive database, which aids
consumers in making educated decisions about the rental and purchase
of movies and would allow consumers to purchase movies, accessories,
72
and other entertainment-related merchandise on the web site."
Brookfield immediately filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. 73 Brookfield sought to
enjoin West Coast Video from using "MovieBuff" both in its domain name
and as a metatag. 74 The district court construed Brookfield's motion for
a temporary restraining order as one for a preliminary injunction and
denied it. 75 The district court held that West Coast Video was the senior
user of the mark "MovieBuff" and that Brookfield had not shown a likelihood of confusion. 76 Brookfield sought and received expedited appellate
77
review.
After discussing the facts and procedural history of the case, Judge
O'Scannlain proceeded to describe "the basics of the Internet and the
World Wide Web."78 Except for some minor oversimplification of how
Internet search engines operate, 7 9 Judge O'Scannlain's basic presenta68. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp, 174 F.3d
at 1041. At the time this case was decided, West Coast Video had over 500 stores. Id.
69. Id. West Coast Video had also used the term "Movie Buff" in advertising campaigns
since at least 1988. Id. at 1042.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1042-43.
73. See id. at 1043.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1043-44.
78. Id. at 1044.
79. See Danny Sullivan, How Search Engines Rank Web Pages, (visited Mar. 12, 2000)
Contrary to O'Scannlain's
<http'//www.searchenginewatch.com/webmasters/rank.html>.
description, not all search engines utilize metatags in their algorithms for determining
search results. Id. Likewise, repetition of the same term within the "Keywords" section of
a page's metatags will not necessarily cause that page to rise on the results list of every
search engine, and might even lead to blackballing by some search engines. See id. Also,
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tion of the workings of the Internet is fundamentally correct.
Judge O'Scannlain then proceeded to consider the issue of whether
West Coast Video's use of the URL www.moviebuff.com infringed upon
Brookfield's trademark, "MovieBuff." While an in-depth analysis of
trademark-infringing domain names is beyond the scope of this paper, it
is important to note that O'Scannlain did find infringement in this case,
and that he considered the domain name issue separately from the
80
metatag issue.
O'Scannlain next turned to the question of "whether West Coast can,
consistently with the trademark and unfair competition laws, use
'MovieBufY8 l or 'moviebuff.com' in its HTML code."8 2 Judge O'Scannlain
correctly observed that, as compared to the issue of trademark infringement via a domain name, "[t]he question in the metatags context is quite
different."8 3 The use of a metatag identical to a competitor's trademark
is less likely to be an infringing action than the use of a domain name
identical to the same trademark:
Although entering "MovieBuffT into a search engine is likely to
bring up a list including "westcoastvideo.com" if West Coast has included that term in its metatags, the resulting confusion is not as great
as where West Coast uses the "moviebuff.com" domain name. First,
when the user inputs "MovieBuff" into an Internet search engine, the
list produced by the search engine is likely to include both West Coast's
and Brookfield's web sites. Thus, in scanning such list, the Web user
will often be able to find the particular web site he is seeking. Moreover, even if the Web user chooses the web site belonging to West Coast,
he will see that the domain name of the web site he selected is
"westcoastvideo.com" Since there is no confusion resulting from the domain address, and since West Coast's initial web page prominently displays its own name, it is difficult to say that a consumer is likely to be
confused about whose site he has reached8 4 or to think that Brookfield
somehow sponsors West Coast's web site.
If Judge O'Scannlain had paused at this point and considered the
"real world" parallel to the cyber situation facing him, and if he had
Yahoo! is technically not a search engine, but rather is a directory of sites, the compilation
and management of which is executed largely by humans. Danny Sullivan, How Search
Engines Work, (visited Mar. 12, 2000) <http://www.searchenginewatch.com/webmasters/
work.html>.
80. See 174 F.3d at 1046-61.
81. Note that although I will follow Judge O'Scannlain's lead in presenting the
"Keyword" metatag at issue here as "MovieBuff," "Keywords" metatags are not case sensitive: "MovieBuff" in the metatag sense is the same as "MOVIEBUFF," "moviebuff," and
"moVIebUfF." In Brookfield, O'Scannlain enjoined West Coast from using "moviebuff" as a
metatag, no matter how many of the letters therein are capitalized.
82. Brookfield v. West Coast Entertainment, 174 F.3d at 1061.
83. Id. at 1062.
84. Id.
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pondered how best to effectuate the fundamental purpose of trademark
law - providing information to consumers, not creating a patent-like
property right in producers - he would have reached the proper answer
to the question of whether or not West Coast Video's use of "moviebuff'
within its metatags infringed upon Brookfield's trademark, "MovieBuff."
He would have found that it did not.
Translating the cyber situation in Brookfield to its "real world" version demonstrates why a finding of no infringement in this case would
have been the correct one. Suppose that instead of surfing the Web for
her Hollywood Insider information needs, O'Scannlain's hypothetical
consumer drives to her local shopping mall and visits the ubiquitous
movies/musicvideo games/computer software superstore there. Instead
of milling randomly around the store hoping to stumble across the perfect product, the consumer asks the clerk - who is playing the role of
"real world search engine" - "Where do you keep your MovieBuff
software?"8 5 The clerk, with arm held aloft to point our consumer on her
way, smiles and cheerfully replies, "Near the end of Aisle Six." When she
arrives at the designated section of the store, the consumer does not find
Brookfield's "MovieBuff' database surrounded by Chris Farley movies
and Backstreet Boys albums, rather she finds it in the midst of other
computer software products. Likely, "MovieBuff' is surrounded most
closely by other programs related to the entertainment industry. In fact,
West Coast Video's "The Movie Buffs Entertainment Industry Database"
86
is probably stocked right next to Brookfield's "MovieBuff."
At this point, our consumer would have the option of picking up
"MovieBuff' and heading to the checkout counter - as she likely would do
if she had been sure when she entered the store that what she wanted
was Brookfield's database, specifically - or she could instead examine
and compare West Coast Video's offering with Brookfield's - as would be
likely if, in her mind, she had asked the clerk about "software for movie
buffs" rather than for any particular database.
85. Or, "Where do you keep your movie buff software?" O'Scannlain holds that West
Coast Video may place "Movie Buff' in its metatags but not "MovieBuff." Id. at 1066. ("We
agree that West Coast can legitimately use an appropriate descriptive term in its metatags.
But 'MovieBuff is not such a descriptive term. Even though it differs from 'Movie Buff by
only a single space, that difference is pivotal. The term 'Movie Buff is a descriptive term,
routinely used in the English language to describe a movie devotee. 'MovieBuff is not. The
term 'MovieBuff is not in the dictionary.... The proper term for 'motion picture enthusiast'
is 'Movie Buff,' which West Coast certainly can use. It cannot, however, omit the space.")
86. As anyone who has ever been to a brick-and-mortar store knows, it is common
practice to place like products with like. Consumers demand this arrangement so that they
can easily make comparisons between similar offerings. Any store owner following the
practice of physically isolating products from their competitors would quickly find herself
out of business.
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Returning for a moment to the parallel cyberworld, it is apparent
that a search engine's results list is meant to mimic the physical display
of products within a brick-and-mortar shop.8 7 Responding to an ambiguous query,88 the search engine returns a list of options most likely to
interest the consumer. The surfer is then free to move either straight to
the site for which she was searching - if she did indeed have such a definite goal in mind - or to use the search list's hyperlinks and her
browser's "Back" button to perform the functional equivalent of picking
up a number of boxes and looking them over before deciding which product to buy.
However, Judge O'Scannlain does not does not stop to make this
analysis following the portion of his opinion most recently quoted in this
paper.8 9 Instead he goes on immediately to assert:
Nevertheless, West Coast's use of "moviebuff.com" in its metatags
will result in what is known as initial interest confusion. Web surfers
looking for Brookfield's "MovieBuff" products who are taken by a search
engine to "westcoastvideo.com" will find a database similar enough to
"MovieBuff" such that a sizable number of consumers who were originally looking for Brookfield's product will simply decide to utilize West
Coast's offerings instead. Although there is no source confusion in the
sense that consumers know they are patronizing West Coast rather
than Brookfield, there is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the
sense that, by using "moviebuff.com" or "MovieBuff" to divert people
looking for "MovieBuff' to its web site, West Coast improperly benefits
from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark. 90
And thus does O'Scannlain's jamming West Coast Video's use of the
metatag, "MovieBuff," into the category of "initial interest confusion"
rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in which Internet
search engines operate. Search engines do not "take" web surfers to any
site, rather they respond to requests for information by providing lists of
sites that, depending on the situation-specific accuracy of the search en87. See Thomas F. Presson & James R. Barney's Trademarks as Metatags: Infringement or Fair Use?, 26 AIPLA Q. J. 147, 166-67 (1998) (providing a useful grocery store
analogy).
88. Just as most consumers do not speak the Queen's English - and so "MovieBuff"
could readily be mistaken by a listener to have been "movie buff," and vice versa - most web
users do not consult a dictionary while surfing. In fact, it is common practice for companies
to include misspellings within their "Keywords" metatags so as to be able to garner the
attention of phonetically-challenged potential customers while still maintaining the professional quality of their visible site. See Presson & Barney, supra note 87 at 149 (noting that
"[tihe metatag section allows Web site operators to include large lists of related words and
phrases, including commonly misspelled terms and multiple variationsof the same phrase,
which would (1) not fit within the text of the site or (2) detract from the site's aesthetic,
literary, or artistic presentation.") (emphasis added).
89. See supra text accompanying note 84.
90. Brookfield v. West Coast Entertainment, 174 F.3d at 1062 (emphases added).
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gines' individual algorithms, are most likely to meet the surfer's needs.
The surfer then chooses from amongst the list of hyperlinks returned
which site(s) she wishes to examine. 9 1 West Coast Video's use of the
metatag, "MovieBuff," would likely suffice to earn it a place on the results lists returned by most search engines, 9 2 but it could do no more
than that. The surfer would still have to pick out the hyperlink to West
Coast Video's site from among all those returned before being "taken" to
that site.
Thus, the only "consumer confusion" that could result from West
Coast Video's use of the metatag, "MovieBuff," is confusion over why
www.westcoastvideo.com was included on the particular search engine's
results list. Given that the fundamental purpose of trademark law is to
provide consumers with information, this hint of "confusion" seems like a
small price to pay when compared to the option - embraced by the Ninth
Circuit in Brookfield - of hiding from poor-spelling, Web-surfing movie
buffs a database meant to fill the same market niche as Brookfield's
"MovieBuff." Trademarks do not provide their holders with patent-like
property rights and they should not be enforced by courts in such a man93
ner as to suppress competition.
Judge O'Scannlain's holding in Brookfield seems to be driven by a
difficulty in finding the proper cyberworld-to-"real world" parallelism.
Rather than realizing that a search engine's results list is closely akin to
a brick-and-mortar store's display case, O'Scannlain insists on forcing an
analogy utilizing the overworked and not terribly accurate "Information
Superhighway" clich6:
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a
billboard on a highway reading-West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at
Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is
located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will pull off
at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast,
but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway entrance, they
may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer West Coast may
find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since
91. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
92. Though not all: Lycos, for example, does not utilize "Keywords" metatags in its
algorithm. See Danny Sullivan, How Search Engines Rank Web Pages, (visited Mar. 12,
2000) <http'//www.searchenginewatch.com/webmasters/rank.html>.
93. This is particularly true when even a surfer who chooses from a search engine's
results list a hyperlink to a web site she does not really want to patronize can cure her
mistake in seconds with a single click of her browser's "Back" button. "Initial interest confusion" in cyberspace does not involve the same sunk costs as its "real world" namesake,
and so should be called upon by courts far less often. Cf Teletech Customer Care Management (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding likelihood of initial interest confusion in a domain name case, but holding that such "brief
confusion is not cognizable under the trademark laws").
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there is a Blockbuster right there. Customers are not confused in the
narrow sense: they are fully aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that Blockbuster is related to,
or in any way sponsored by, West Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that
there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that
Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast's acquired
94
goodwill.
However, this analogy does not fit with the case presented by West
Coast Video's use of the metatag, "MovieBuff." Even holding aside the
obvious differences between getting off a highway and driving around
and following a hyperlink and scanning a web page, the hypothetical situation presented by Judge O'Scannlain is inapposite. In order for the
facts of Brookfield to parallel those presented by O'Scannlain's Blockbuster example, the hyperlink to West Coast Video's site - returned on the
results list generated by a search engine queried for "moviebuff" - would
have to read something to the effect of "MovieBuff - searchable database
of Hollywood Insider information brought to you by Brookfield Communications," and the West Coast Video URL to which the entry was linked
- www.westcoastvideo.com - would have to be hidden from the surfer.
No such facts are presented in Brookfield, nor would West Coast Video's
use of the metatag, "MovieBuff," on its www.westcoastvideo.com site lead
to any.
While Judge O'Scannlain arrived at the wrong result in Brookfield
because he misunderstood how search engines operate and was taken in
by the omnipresent "Information Superhighway" clichd, it is important
to note that the case presented such a difficult problem because search
engines currently do not allow the surfer who types in "MovieBuff' desiring specifically to find Brookfield's "MovieBuff' database to differentiate
herself from the surfer who types in "moviebuff" seeking information
generally of interest to movie buffs.
H.

PLAYBOY ENTERS., INC. V. WELLES

The other leading case on the use by one web site owner of another
company's trademarks as "Keywords" metatags is Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Welles. 9 5
The fact pattern presented by Welles is more interesting than that of
Calvin Designer Label, 96 AsiaFocus,97 or Global Site Designs.98 First,
Terri Welles, the defendant in this case, did not use a PEI trademark
94. Brookfield v. West Coast Entertainment, 174 F.3d at 1064.
95. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (preliminary
injunction denied), affd without op., 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Welles. 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (summary judgment granted to defendant).
96. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
See supra Part LV.C.
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within the domain name of her web site. 9 9 This fact necessarily prevented Judge Keep from conflating the metatag infringement issue with
any domain name infringement question - a separation not always
firmly kept by the three earlier PEI cases. Second, because Welles was
PEI's "Playmate of the Year for 1981," 100 she had a plausible fair use
defense with respect to the use of the terms "Playboy" and "Playmate"
within her "Keywords" metatags that the earlier defendants simply
could not claim. 10 1 Third, Welles seems to have acted in good faith in
indexing her web site, 10 2 rather than having simply tried to siphon off
profits from PEI.
1.

PEI'sAction for a PreliminaryInjunction

In PEI's action to preliminarily enjoin Welles from, inter alia, using
the terms "Playboy" and "Playmate" within the "Keywords" metatags of
her web site, Judge Keep began her examination of the trademark questions at issue by noting that the relevant facts before the court were not
in dispute. She established that "PEI owns federally registered trademarks for the terms Playboy, Playmate, Playmate of the Month, and
Playmate of the Year."1 0 3 At the same time, "[diefendant uses the terms
Playboy and Playmate along with other terms within the keywords section of the meta tags, which constitutes the internal index of the website
10 4
used by some search engines."
Judge Keep then launched into a thoughtful and cogent analysis of
the merits of Welles' fair use defense to PEI's claims of trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and trademark dilution. Keep
97. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus, 1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. 1998). See supra
Part IV.D.
98. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Global Designs, 1999 WL 311707 (S.D. Fla. 1999). See
supra Part IV.F.
99. Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1104, (noting that Ms. Welles "does not
use Playboy or Playmate in her domain name"). The domain name of Ms. Welles' web site
is www.terriwelles.com. Id.
100. Id. at 1103.
101. "The problem in this case is that the trademarks that defendant uses, and the
manner in which she uses them, describe her and identify her." Id. This raises a question
of whether there is a 'fair use' of these marks pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(b)(4) and
1125(c)(4)." Id.
102. "Since May of 1997, defendant has been in contact with plaintiff about the design
and creation of her web site." Id. at 1101. "Ms. Welles has minimized her references to
Playboy on her website and has not attempted to trick customers into believing that they
are viewing a Playboy-endorsed website." Id. at 1103-04. "Finally, it appears that defendant has used the trademarks in good faith." Id. "She has removed some of the references
per PEI's request, has not used the bunny logo, and has added a disclaimer to the vast
majority of her free web pages." Id. at 1104.
103. Id. at 1100.
104. Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1101.
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first noted that Welles is a Playboy Playmate: "Much like Academy
Award winners, crowned Miss Americas, and Heisman Trophy winners,
Playboy Playmates are given a title which becomes part of their identity
and adds value to their name." 10 5 As such, Keep found Welles' use of
PEI's trademarks in her "Keywords" metatags - "She has also used the
terms Playboy and Playmate as meta tags for her site so that those using
search engines on the Web can find her website if they were looking for a
Playboy Playmate."1 0 6 - to be fair:
Ms. Welles' use of the terms Playmate and Playmate of the Year constitute identification of herself. The use of those terms, in the website and
in the meta tags, allows websurfers and potential customers to identify
her services, whether it be her line of cigars, her promotional services,
or her nude photographs. Given that Ms. Welles is the "Playmate of the
Year 1981," there is no other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe herself and her services without venturing into absurd descriptive phrases. In cases where the trademarked term must be used to
identify the individual or good, infringement and dilution laws do not
apply. 107
In forcefully coming to such a conclusion, Judge Keep became the
first Jurist presented with the question of whether one web site's use in
its "Keywords" metatags of another company's trademarks constituted
trademark infringement or dilution to find that it did not. Judge Keep's
holding in PEI's action for a preliminary injunction predated Brookfield, 0 8s but unfortunately did not prove to be as persuasive to the Ninth
Circuit as it might have. The lesson that metatags are tools to aid web
surfers was lost. As was the notion that when a surfer enters a descriptive term into a search engine in an attempt to find sites related to that
term, the surfer's goal should not be frustrated by the courts' overprotection of trademarks, which are often not being used by the surfer in their
trademark sense.
While Welles did undoubtedly present a stronger case for the defendant than did Brookfield, it is important to note also that Judge Keep's
understanding of how metatags fit into the architecture of cyberspace is
more nuanced and more correct than is Judge O'Scannlain's (i.e., Judge
Keep is not under the misapprehension that search engines "take" web
surfers anywhere), and this better understanding of the form and function of metatags allowed her to evaluate the trademark issues surrounding them with a clearer eye:
105. Id at 1102.
106. Id. at 1103.
107. Id. at 1105.
108. Playboy Enters. v. Welles was in fact cited by Judge O'Scannlain in Brookfield as
"the case most on point," 174 F.3d 1036, 1065, immediately before O'Scannlain launched
into his rather tortured discussion of the difference between "MovieBuff' and "Movie Buff."
See supra note 85.
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With respect to the meta tags, the court finds there to be no trademark
infringement where defendant has used plaintiffs trademarks in good
faith to index the content of her website. The meta tags are not visible
to the websurfer although some search engines rely on these tags to
help websurfers find certain websites. Much like the subject index of a
card catalog, the meta tags give the websurfer using a search engine a
clearer indication of the content of a website. 10 9
2.

Welles' Motion for Summary Judgment

In her opinion, which grants defendant Welles summary judgment
on all of PEI's claims,1 10 Judge Keep went even further in her attempt to
provide a framework for evaluating claims of trademark infringement
and dilution arising in cyberspace. In contrast to O'Scannlain's rather
strained opinion in Brookfield, which forces the Internet to conform to
the ("real world") Law, Keep provided an analysis which is "flexible and
reflective of emerging technologies."'
She was, in writing her second
Welles opinion, ever mindful that the courts "must not lose sight of either
common sense or the important, foundational and underlying principles
of trademark law." 1 2 Judge Keep found a way to adapt the fiction of the
Law to the reality of the Internet.
After drawing on her preliminary injunction opinion to set forth the
general background facts of the dispute,"13 Keep made absolutely clear
what the relevant point of contention was: "Plaintiff alleges that Ms.
Welles' use of its trademarks, 'Playboy,' 'Playmate,' and 'Playmate of the
Year' in the HTML source code of her website constitutes an infringing
and diluting trademark use of its marks.""14 Rather than launching immediately into her analysis from that point, though, Judge Keep
presented a clear, concise, and accurate description of how metatags
work and how search engines utilize them:
Users searching for a specific website can either type it into a web
browser to access the site directly, or they can utilize a "search engine"
available on the Web to search for a specific website by keywords and
phrases. Listings or results are the end product of a search. There are
two basic types of search engines: human powered and web-crawler.
Human-powered search engines produce human-compiled listings
which have been approved and categorized by human search engine editors, much like how a librarian might catalog books in the library.
109. Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
110. Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066.
111. Id. at 1095 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1071-72.
114. Id. at 1091 (noting that "[the metatag keywords on Ms. Welles' website reads,
'terri, welles, playmate, playboy, model, models, semi-nudity, naked, breast, breasts, tit,
tits, nipple, nipples, ass, butt.'").
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Changes to a website's meta tag descriptors, keywords, or HTML title
have no impact on human-compiled listings or search results unless a
human editor decides to follow or endorse these changes. However, due
to the inordinate amount of websites, human editors cannot classify
everything, and consequently, some search engines are more reliant on
the web-crawler than the human-powered engines, or human editors.
Web crawlers "read" individual web pages by reading much of the
text in the HTML source code and store in cyberspace memory the text
they find on each page. In addition to providing a listing of search results which was initiated by the consumer's typing of keywords or
phrases into a browser, search engines enable consumers to sort
through their listings by ranking pages so that the pages which best
match their relevancy criteria are listed first, then continuing in chronological order. The criteria or algorithm used by search engines to rank
search results in response to a particular search query varies among
different search engines and even within search engines, as these
formula continue to change from time to time. These criteria or algorithms are a combination of many various factors, including but not limited to, the frequency of words on a page, the location of words, the
HTML title, and metatags (meta descriptors and meta keywords). The
title tag is text that is used as the title of a web page in the listings of a
crawler-based search engine. Metatags are mostly used to provide additional information about a web page and are not ordinarily viewed by
users. The meta descriptors allows web page authors to state the exact
description they would like to have for their web pages as listed in the
search results of a web crawler search engine, and the meta keyword
tags allow page authors, at least in theory, to identify or add words to
relate the contents of
their pages in order to better define or accurately
115
the page for the web crawler search engine.
Against this backdrop, Judge Keep presented her analysis of
whether PEI's trademark claims against Terri Welles could withstand
summary judgment. She began by noting that "[pilaintiff relies on
Brookfield Communications."1 16 PEI's reliance on Brookfield was hardly
surprising - it was, after all, a recently-decided Ninth Circuit case very
nearly on point - and shows the danger that a poorly reasoned decision
early in the development of a body of law can pose to the entire area of
law. Fortunately, Judge Keep was able to distinguish Welles from Brookfield. Unfortunately, in so doing she cited with approval O'Scannlain's
1 17
application of "initial interest confusion" to trademark metatag cases.
Keep's path around Brookfield ran directly through the fair use doc115. Id. at 1091-92. (citations omitted)
116. Id.
117. "Although Plaintiff is correct in citing Brookfield for the proposition that 'likelihood
of confusion can be shown on the basis of initial interest confusion,' Plaintiff's reliance on
Brookfield is misplaced as applied to Ms. Welles' case." Id.
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trine. 1 18 While this utilization of fair use did allow Judge Keep to come
to the proper conclusion in Welles, it is important to note that such an
analysis necessarily assumes that the terms being used are indeed being
used as trademarks, and that the specific use of the trademarked terms
is allowable only because it is fair and/or necessary. As the goal of this
article is to explain the necessity of the disaggregation of the trademark
use of metatags from the descriptive use of metatags, it is essential to
emphasize here that Judge Keep's employment of the fair use doctrine to
find her way to the correct holding in Welles is a second-best solution.
There is, in fact, a sense about Welles that Brookfield is not quite
right, and that the consistent application of a Brookfield analysis over
the cases to arise in the future will lead to some odd results. 119 Even
when relying upon Brookfield to determine the method of evaluating
PEI's claims in Welles, Judge Keep cited the "difficult to say that a customer is likely to be confused about whose site he has reached" language
from the early stages of Judge O'Scannlain's analysis, 120 see supra text
accompanying note 84, rather than any part of Brookfield coming up after O'Scannlain took a wrong turn on his "Information Superhighway."
Instead of breaking away from Brookfield, 12 1 though, Keep chose to
limit the damage of the Brookfield holding by stressing that a finding of
"initial interest confusion" did not mean the end of the trademark inquiry: "Dr.Seuss, like Brookfield, held that initial interest confusion is
actionable under the Lanham Act, not that a finding of initial interest
confusion compelled a finding of trademark infringement or barred a
finding of fair use." 12 2 Keep further advanced the case for a flexible doctrine with a foundation in common sense by noting that Welles' use of
PEI's trademarked terms in her metatags was done in good faith, and
23
that such lack of foul motive was important.
Though Judge Keep carefully confined the basis of her actual holding to the fact that Welles' use of PEI's trademarked terms was "a nominative fair use,"1 2 4 her dicta concerning the policy of trademark law and
118. "[A]lthough Brookfield concerned the use of the plaintiffs trademarked terms in
the metatags of the defendant's website, it did not involve the use of the fair use defense
within the metatags context." Id. at 1093.
119. "Thus, the court finds that insofar as Plaintiff relies on Brookfield to support its
position, Brookfield is distinguishable since the defendant's use in Brookfield of the word
'MovieBuff was found not to have been a descriptive use (although the court noted that the
term 'Movie Buff (with a single space) is a descriptive term and that the difference was
pivotal)." Id.
120. See id. at 1093-94.
121. Which is, of course, controlling law for district courts within the Ninth Circuit.
122. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
123. "Furthermore, there is no evidence in this case that Ms. Welles has intended to
divert Plaintiffs customers to her website by trading on PEI's goodwill." Id. at 1095.
124. Id. at 1096.
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the structure and potential of the Internet deserve careful consideration.
Keep did not fall prey to thinking of the Internet in clich6d terms. Instead she suggested that intellectual property doctrines designed for application to other media should be probed carefully for their relevance to
and effectiveness in dealing with the unique challenges posed by the
Internet:
The World Wide Web is a commercial marketplace and a free speech
marketplace. To give consumers access to it, the court must also be
careful to give consumers the freedom to locate desired sites while protecting the integrity of trademarks and trade names. The court stresses
that the underlying or foundational purpose of trademark protection is
not to create a property interest in all words used in a commercial context, but rather "[tihe policies of free competition and free use of lanforbid the commercial use of
guage dictate that trademark law12cannot
5
terms in their descriptive sense."
Judge Keep's description of how trademark law should be applied in
the context of the Internet is exactly right. Unfortunately, the current
method of utilizing metatags by search engines coupled with the passivity of Congress and the Ninth Circuit's holding in Brookfield make the
realization of such lofty goals unlikely.
After holding that "[plaintiff has failed to raise a material issue of
fact concerning the fair use of PEI terms in [Welles'] metatags," 126 and
granting summary judgment to defendant Welles on PEI's claims of
trademark infringement, 1 2 7 Judge Keep went on to make short shrift of
PEI's trademark dilution 128 claims, holding that "as a matter of law [ ]
Defendant Welles' use of the terms 'Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981,'
'Playmate of the Year 1981,' 'PMOY '81,' 'Playmate,' and 'Playboy' does
12 9
not dilute PEI's trademarks."
Of course, in the world this paper suggests that we move toward, the
distinction in the metatag context between trademark infringement and
trademark dilution would become irrelevant.

125. Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1095 (quoting 1 J. McCARTHY,
11.45, at 82 (1999)).
126. Id. at 1096.
127. Id.
128. "Dilution is defined as 'the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of... (2) likelihood
of confusion, mistake, or deception.'" 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999). Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a dilution claim is not actionable if there is a "[flair use of a famous
mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify
the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(4)(A) (1999).
129. Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §
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STATE Soc'y OF CERTIFIEDPUBLIC AccoUNTANTs v.

ERic Louzs Assocs.,

INc.

In New York State Soc'y of Certified Public Accountants v. Eric Louis
Assocs., Inc.,130 the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants sued an accountant placement firm for an injunction and attorneys'
fees on theories of false designation of origin and trademark dilution.
The NYSSCPA alleged that that defendant ELA's use of the NYSSCPA's
unregistered "NYSSCPA" mark in ELA's Internet domain name 13 1 and
as a metatag constituted infringement. ELA consented to the entry of a
permanent injunction, 13 2 and the court awarded the NYSSCPA attor13 3
neys' fees.
While this case is noteworthy because Judge Sand found that the
defendant's conduct (essentially ignoring the NYSSCPA's cease-and-desist letters) rose to the level of willfulness required to award attorneys'
fees,' 3 4 it is of limited import with respect to the question of when the
metatag use of another's trademarked terms constitutes a violation of
the Lanham Act for two separate reasons. First, Judge Sand consistently considered ELA's use of the metatag "NYSSCPA" in conjunction
with its use of the domain name www.nysscpa.com. Second, Sand exhibits some amount of the misunderstanding of how search engines operate
that plagued Judge O'Scannlain's Brookfield opinion.
Judge Sand's conflation of the metatag issue in this case with the
domain name issue necessarily makes relatively hollow his finding that
ELA's use of the NYSSCPA's trademarked term as a metatag was improper. In considering the secondary meaning prong of the NYSSCPA's
false designation of origin claim, Sand stated that, "[diefendant's use of
the 'nysscpa.com' domain name and the 'NYSSCPA' meta-tag is clear evidence of an attempt to plagiarize the Society's mark."' 3 5 In considering
the likelihood of confusion prong, Judge Sand's subheading number one
reads: "The 'nysscpa.com' Domain Name and the 'NYSSCPA' MetaTag."136 Sand's holding on issue of likelihood of confusion was similarly
a holding based on the combined effect of the domain name and the
metatag:
130. New York State Soc'y of Certified Public Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79
F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (decided on December 2, 1999, one day after Welles was
granted summary judgment in Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066).
131. On January 9, 1999, ELA registered the domain name www.nysscpa.com. Id. at

339.
132. The permanent injunction order was issued on June 1, 1999. Id. at 333.
133. The court used the lodestar method of calculating attorneys' fees and awarded
NYSSCPA $46,818.48. Id. at 352, 357.
134. Id. at 350.
135. 79 F. Supp. 2d at 340 (emphasis added).

136. Id.
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we find that Defendant's use of the "nysscpa.com" domain name and the
"NYSSCPA" meta-tag caused a likelihood of confusion because it created initial interest confusion. Having also found that Plaintiffs NYSSCPA mark has acquired secondary meaning, the Court holds that these
actions constitute false designation of origin under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.137

As can be presumed from the language quoted above, Judge Sand
cited with approval Judge O'Scannlain's Brookfield holding. 138 In addition to following suit in endorsing the application of "initial interest confusion" to claims arising in cyberspace, Sand demonstrated the same
fundamental misapprehension of the manner in which search engines
operate that led O'Scannlain to fret over the possibility that unsuspecting web surfers would be "taken" to sites they did not intend to visit due
to the unscrupulous use by those sites in their metatags of other companies' trademarked terms. In his Findings of Fact, Judge Sand asserted
that "each of [ELA's] sites used 'NYSSCPA' as a 'meta-tag' within its
HTML code, such that an internet search for NYSSCPA would lead to
each of the three sites."1 39 Judge Sand also accepted the NYSSCPA's
assertion that "ELA's placement of meta-tags using the Society's NYSSCPA mark in the HTML code of each of its three web sites ensur[ed] that
anyone seeking out the Society on the World Wide Web by using its well140
known servicemark would be diverted to [ELA's] web site."
While this case was decided quite recently, and while it did emanate
from the Southern District of New York, its analysis of the metatag issue
is polluted enough with domain name considerations, and its misapprehension of the functioning of search engines is fundamental enough, that
the case itself deserves little more consideration than as a vote for
Brookfield.
J.

SNA, INc. V.ARRAY

In SNA, Inc. v. Array, 14 1 the manufacturer of kits for Seawind amphibious airplanes sued one company, Turbine Design, which assembled
Seawinds for kit purchasers and another company, Horizon Unlimited,
which published a newsletter called "The Seawind Builders Newsletter"
for, inter alia, trademark infringement and unfair competition. Each of
the defendants in this action operated a web site that "currently or in the
past have discussed plaintiffs." 14 2 However, Judge Katz focused on the
137. Id. at 342.
138. See id.

139. New York State Soc'y of Certified Public Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79
F. Supp. 2d at 339 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 347 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
142. Id. at 558.
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actions of Horizon Unlimited with respect to his discussion of possible
trademark violations through Horizon Unlimited's use in its domain
name and as a metatag of SNA's common law trademark, "Seawind."
This case is important for two reasons. First, while both the use of a
domain name and the use of a metatag were challenged as infringing
upon the same trademark, Judge Katz was careful to consider the issues
separately.143 Second, while Judge Katz relied heavily on Judge Keep's
first Welles decision for both his description of metatags and his analysis
of them in the trademark context, 144 he went beyond Judge Keep's holding in Welles and requireda showing that the use of a descriptive trademarked term be in good faith in order for the metatag user of another's
trademark to avoid infringement liability:
Plaintiffs argue that the use of the word "Seawind" in meta tagging
the seawind.net site is an unfair trade practice. See Pl.Ex. 62 at 102,
106 (illustrating defendants' practice of typing a block of text repeating
the words "Seawind," "SEAWIND," and "seawind" many times). The
court agrees that defendants intentionally use plaintiffs' mark in this
way to lure internet users to their site instead of SNA's official site.
This is true whether the meta tagging is visible or hidden in the code,
and no matter what the website's domain name is. This case can be
distinguished from Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 7 F.Supp.2d
1098 (S.D.Cal.1998), in a crucial way: In that case, the court found that
defendant "used plaintiffs trademarks in good faith to index the content
of her website." Id. at 1104. Here, based on the repetitious usage and
the evidence of defendants' general intent to harm plaintiffs, the court
cannot find that this use is a similar good faith effort simply to index
the content of the website; instead, it is a bad faith effort to confuse
internet users that is likely to succeed. Defendants' meta tagging will
thus be enjoined. 145
In the court's final judgment, both defendants were "enjoined from
meta tagging their websites, whatever the domain name, with the word
14 6
'Seawind.'"
This holding is overly broad. Both of the defendants in this case performed legitimate business functions that were peripheral to the plaintiffs business of manufacturing Seawind kits. Each of the defendant's
web sites "currently or in the past have discussed plaintiffs." 14 7 Horizon
Unlimited, in particular, made its entire business the discussion of SNA's
Seawind aircraft. Clearly, using the term "Seawind" in its metatags
would comport with Judge Katz's stated notion of what purpose
metatags serve: "Much like the subject index of a card catalog, the meta
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 562-63.
See id. at 562-63 & n.10.
Id at 562-63.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 558.
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tags give the websurfer using a search engine a clearer indication of the
content of a website." 148 Rather than merely enjoining Horizon Unlimited from "stuffing," 14 9 though, Judge Katz forbid the company from any
use of the term, "Seawind" within its metatags.
While this was no doubt an effective punishment for Horizon Unlimited, it also effectively punishes the web surfing Seawind enthusiast who
now may not be able to find Horizon Unlimited's Seawind newsletter.
One can imagine that a site containing "The Seawind Builders Newsletter" is precisely the result many surfers who input "Seawind" into an Internet search engine would be hoping for. They would be looking not
only for SNA's official site, but also sites discussing Seawinds, offering to
sell accessories for Seawinds, advertising the capability to repair
Seawinds, providing contact information for Seawind enthusiast clubs,
and so forth. In each case, the term, "Seawind" in the site's "Keywords"
metatags would be part of an accurate description of the content of the
site. In each case, the web surfer should not have to surmount judicially
imposed barriers in order to find the site.
Taken at face value, the holding of SNA is even more extreme than
that of Brookfield. I suggest, however, that it was the totality of the circumstances - not the least of which being Horizon Unlimited's use of the
domain name, "www.seawind.net" - that led Judge Katz to his hasty ruling that a site discussing another company's product may not use the
trademarked name of that product within its "Keywords" metatags, and
that such a ruling will soon clearly be an outlier, regardless of whether
or not the suggestions made by this paper are adopted.
K.

SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT CASE LAw

Though there have still been very few cases considering the alleged
improper use of trademarked terms within the metatags of non-trademark holders' web sites, a number of important trends have emerged.
First, the use of another company's trademarked term(s) by a company
with absolutely no purpose for using the term(s) other than to misleadingly associate itself with the company or organization holding the trademark - particularly when coupled with the use of a deceptive domain
name - will be enjoined and damages may be assessed. 150 Second,
148. Id. at 562 (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104).
149. See Mark Everett Chancey, Meta-Tags and Hypertext Deep Linking: How the Essential Components of Webauthoring and Internet GuidanceAre Strengthening Intellectual
PropertyRights on the World Wide Web, 29 STETSON L. REV. 203, 208 n.31 (1999) (describing "stuffing" as the repetition of a word many times in a row within a site's "Keywords"
metatags in order to improve the site's position within a search engine's results list generated with relation to web surfer queries containing the repeated word).
150. See New York State Soc'y of Certified Public Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs.,
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Playboy Enters. Int'l, Inc. v. Global Site Designs,
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courts have so far been erring on the side of overprotecting the rights of
trademark holders. 15 1 Finally, in the one case where the right of the
non-trademark holder to use the trademarked terms was absolutely
clear and was executed in good faith, Judge Keep allowed the use in a
15 2
pair of detailed and cogent decisions.
V. ACADEMIC COMMENTARY
Just as there are is a dearth of case law addressing the trademarkmetatag issue, there is not very much academic commentary dealing explicitly with the subject. However, as the number of cases being filed
alleging Lanham Act violations by way of metatags grows, so grows the
amount and variety of commentators' responses.
For the most part, articles written that address the subject of trademark disputes over the use of one company's trademarked terms in the
metatags of another company's web site tend to do little more than recount the language and standard interpretations of the Lanham Act and
describe the fact patterns and holdings of the few metatag cases decided
thus far. There are, however, a few articles that offer their readers more
probing analyses and even cogent suggestions for the manner in which
the law ought to develop.
This section of the paper provides a broad overview of the academic
commentary that currently exists in regard to the trademark-metatag
issue. A number of representative pieces are briefly discussed, with
more time spent on those articles with more to offer.
A.

EARLY, PRESCIENT ARTICLES

The best example of an article ahead of its time on this issue is
Marcelo Halpern's Meta-Tags: Effective Marketing or Unfair Competition?.153 In quite a short piece, Halpern lays out nicely a number of the
issues just about to explode into the American judicial system. He examines trademark and unfair competition problems raised by the use of
trademarked terms within metatags, and correctly anticipates that such
use could give rise to infringement, dilution, and unfair competition suits
Inc., 1999 WL 311707 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc.,
27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., 1998 WL
724000 (E.D. Va. 1998); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220
(N.D. Cal. 1997).
151. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036 (9th Cir. 1999); SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
152. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (preliminary injunction denied), affd without op., 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998); 78 F. Supp. 2d
1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (summary judgment granted to defendant).
153. Marcelo Halpern, Meta-Tags: Effective Marketing or Unfair Competetion?, 2 No. 7
CYBERSPACE LAw. 2 (October, 1997).
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under United States law. Halpern even anticipates the application of
"initial interest confusion" to the use of trademarked terms in
54
metatags.1
While, since it was written before the vast majority of the case law in
the field existed, Halpern's article is really of very little use anymore, it
remains a truly impressive piece of premonition.

B.

ARTICLES TOUCHING ON THE TRADEMARK-METATAG ISSUE ONLY
IN PASSING

There have been a number of articles written that deal with one or
another aspect of trademark law as it relates to the Internet that also
briefly touch on the metatag issue.
Jason R. Berne's Court Intervention But Not in a Classic Form: A
Survey of Remedies in Internet Trademark Cases15 5 is concerned mainly
with the many domain name cases that have been decided recently.
However, it does also provide a fairly detailed analysis of the facts and
holdings of the PEI metatag cases, Oppedahl & Larson, and
156
Brookfield.
Karen M. Shorofsky's Advertising and Promotions on the Internet157
is a solid representative of the PLI offerings concerning the trademark
issues arising in cyberspace. The article's coverage of the various issues
is broad and shallow; the metatag cases are grouped together and their
facts and holdings are listed very briefly.
Matthew A. Kaminer's The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Trademark Keyword Banners158 is an interesting article focusing on the keying of query terms entered into Internet search engines to
the banner advertisements that appear on the results lists pages gener154. "However, a likelihood of confusion does not require the customer to be actually
deceived upon arriving at the site; it may be sufficient to show that the customer was
deceived by being drawn into the site in the first instance. The underlying premise of
trademark and unfair competition law is that no one should be permitted to trade and
profit offthe good name or mark of another. Thus, when the search engine is 'deceived' into
believing that Competitor's site is a relevant response to the search for Sample Co., and
this information is furnished to the end user, there may be a likelihood of confusion as to
the association or affiliation of the website to the company or product for which the end
user was searching. The original misrepresentation to the search engine is the source of
the confusion and the fact that Sample Co.'s distinctive mark was used to cause that confusion creates grounds for an action for trademark infringement." Id. at 4.
155. Jason R. Berne, Court Intervention But Not in a Classic Form: A Survey of Remedies in Internet Trademark Cases, 43 ST. Louis U. L. J. 1157 (1999).
156. Id. at 1178-88.
157. Karen M. Shorofsky, Advertising and Promotionson the Internet, 563 PLI/Pat 659
(1999).
158. Mathew A. Kaminer, The Limitationsof TrademarkLaw in Addressing Trademark
Keyword Banners, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 35 (1999).
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ated in response to the query. Kaminer argues that trademark keyword
banners ("TKB") should not be seen as a violation of the Lanham Act,
and he provides a favorable comparison of TKB to "manipulative
159
metatagging" in order to support his argument.
C.

ARTICLES OFFERING A GREATER LEVEL OF
ANALYSIS AND/OR ARGUMENT

A relatively small number of articles have gone beyond listing the
facts and holdings of the trademark-metatag cases and additionally offer
analyses of how the law is performing and/or suggestions for the direction its development should take.
Brian Kennan's Diverting Traffic on the Web 160 offers both a solid
technical primer on how metatags function within the architecture of the
Internet and an evaluation of the judiciary's handling of the trademarkmetatag cases so far. While Kennan's detailed analysis is limited to
Brookfield, Welles, and RMD, he does strike out a position that so far the
courts are properly fitting traditional trademark law to the Internet. 16 1
Mark Everett Chancey's Meta-Tags and Hypertext Deep Linking:
How the Essential Components of Webauthoring and Internet Guidance
16 2
are StrengtheningIntellectual PropertyRights on the World Wide Web
argues that dilution, rather than infringement, is the more suitable
cause of action when one site incorporates within its metatags another
company's trademarks. 163 The main thrust of his argument is that the
basic "likelihood of confusion" test for an infringement claim will generally need to be twisted in order for courts to reach just results, whereas
courts could reach the same results while remaining true to the notions
of "blurring" and "tarnishment."16 4 Chancey also expresses disappointment with the Brookfield court for twisting and expanding the scope of
infringement rather than evaluating the case under the dilution
framework. 165
Katherine E. Gasparek's Applying the Fair Use Doctrine in Traditional Infringement and Dilution Cases to Internet Meta Tagging or Link159. Id. at 45-53.
160. Brian Kennan, Diverting Traffic on the Web, 1999 INTERNET LAw & REGULATION
SPECIAL REPORT 1 (1999).

161. Id. at 4-9 (arguing that all three cases were properly decided).
162. Mark Everett Chancey, Meta-Tags and Hypertext Deep Linking: How the Essential
Components of Webauthoring and Internet Guidance are Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights on the World Wide Web, 29 STETSON L. REV. 203 (1999).
163. See id. at 222-27.
164. See id. at 223-24.
165. See id. at 226-27.
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ing Cases166 offers both a wonderful history of the development of the

Internet 16 7 and a cogent argument that the traditional fair use defense,
operating within the traditional trademark infringement and trademark
dilution paradigms, is all that courts need to properly evaluate trademark-metatag (and trademark-hyperlink) claims. 168 Gasparek's conclusion, however, is more caveat than assertion:
Even though the Internet is an emerging and constantly growing
phenomenon, traditional legal rules are nonetheless useful in resolving
conflicts. The traditional defense of fair use in trademark infringement
and dilution cases is flexible enough to apply to meta tagging and linking cases on the Internet, as long as the court can easily identify good
faith and lack of consumer confusion. The fair use defense is not concretely defined and its application has always depended on the circumstances of the individual case. This lack of structure is frustrating for
trademark holders and accidental infringers, and even possibly for the
courts, but its very flexibility will allow it to extend to the utmost
boundaries of Internet meta tag and linking controversies. The fair use
defense will provide courts with the flexibility to determine if the facts
of the case, including likelihood of confusion and good faith, support its
use. 169
D.

TRADEMARKS AS METATAGS: INFRINGEMENT OR FAIR USE?

Easily the best article written to date on the trademark-metatag issue is Thomas F. Presson & James R. Barney's Trademarks as Metatags:
Infringement or Fair Use?.' 70 Presson and Barney argue strongly
against a per se rule barring the use of "invisible trademarks" from nonholders' web sites, 17 1 and suggest, less forcefully and less explicitly, that
the use of others' trademarked terms within metatags should almost al1 72
ways be considered fair.
After articulating a rather strained argument that that the use of
trademarked terms within metatags might not be, as required for liabil166. Katherine E. Gasparek, Applying the Fair Use Doctrine in TraditionalInfringement and Dilution Cases to Internet Meta Tagging or Linking Cases, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV.
787 (1999).
167. See id. at 789-91.
168. See id. at 818-23. It should be noted that Gasparek wrote her article before Brookfield was decided.
169. Id. at 823 (emphasis added).
170. Thomas F. Presson & James R. Barney, Trademarks as Metatags: Infringement or
Fair Use?, 26 AIPLA Q. J. 147 (1998). What is perhaps most impressive about this article
is that it was written before either Brookfield or Welles was decided.
171. See id. at 149-50, 176.
172. See id. at 165-78.
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ity under the Lanham Act, 17 3 "use in commerce" at all, 174 Presson and
Barney proceed to consider briefly the availability of First Amendment
17 5
defenses to the users of others' trademarks within their metatags.
Not surprisingly, the authors conclude that such defenses would better
76
serve a noncommercial user than a commercial user.1
Presson and Barney then move on to the meat of their article: Fair
Use. 17 7 In their fair use analysis, the authors attempt to show where the
line should be drawn between "comparative advertising" and "deceptive
advertising" in the trademark-metatag context. 178 They note that comparative advertising is not only allowed, 179 but is actively encouraged.18 0
Presson and Barney thoughtfully explain the manner in which some
uses of others' trademarked terms in metatags should be viewed as protected comparative advertising:
The argument that some trademark metatag uses may be acceptable forms of comparative advertising depends on a preliminary analytical step. Rather than focusing on the actual inclusion of the trademark
term in the metatag section of a Web site, one must look instead at the
results of such inclusion. This analysis is logical given the unique environment in which metatags are used. Since they are not visible to ordinary users and can only be read by search engines in the context of
HTML, then to the extent that metatags are used in commerce at all,
such use is not manifested until a search engine actually reads the
metatags in HTML and returns the results in user-readable form.
In practice, when a Web site operator inserts another company's
trademark name into the metatag section of her Web site, she is ensuring her site's address will appear on any list generated by a user's
81
search request for the other company's trademark name.'
The authors then proceed to note that this action is functionally indistinguishable from the "clustering" of like products that occurs in practically all brick-and-motor stores,' 8 2 and that consumers would best be
83
served if it were similarly allowed.'
173. See id. at 154 (noting that, under the Lanham Act, there can be no liability unless
"a threshold element of Sections 32(1), 43(a), and[/or] 43(c) [is] met: a determination that
the allegedly infringing mark was used in commerce.").
174. See id. at 154-59.
175. Presson & Barney, supra note 170 at 159-63.
176. See id. at 160-63.
177. See id.at 164-78.
178. See id. at 164-72.
179. See id. at 164 (citing Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375 (1910)).
180. See id. at 165 (noting that "the official policy of the Federal Trade Commission is to
promote truthful comparative advertising").
181. Presson & Barney, supra note 170 at 165-66 (footnote omitted).
182. See id.at 166-67.
183. See id. (noting that "[t]he ability of consumers to compare products 'side-by-side' is
absolutely essential to the success of the Internet as an electronic marketplace.").
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Presson and Barney focus on the "likelihood of confusion" test as the
limiting principal to their comparative advertising analysis.1 8 4 They
note their concern that "the unauthorized use of trademarks as metatags
might fall prey to a judicial ruling that such use is likely to create confusion per se," 18 5 and "argue that such a rule would be overly broad and
18 6
unjustified."
Turning to "actual confusion," the authors note that there may indeed be consumer confusion generated by the results list returned by the
search engine the web surfer has just utilized.1 8 7 However, rather than
quitting their analysis there, Presson and Barney continue to describe
the three possible actions a web surfer could take when faced with a results list that includes multiple "hits":
At this point, the user may click any Web site address on the list to
visit that site. With respect to consumer confusion, there are three possibilities: (1) the user actually thinks he is visiting the trademark
owner's site, when in fact he is not; (2) the user is unsure as to the
affiliation of the Web site but visits to "check it out;" or (3) the user
knows that the site is not affiliated with the trademark owner but visits
it anyway out of curiosity or genuine interest.18 8
The authors then note that (3) is clearly not indicative of consumer
confusion, and that (2) might be, before focusing their analysis on (1), the
"worst-case situation." 18 9 In implicitly rejecting the application of "initial interest confusion" to the trademark-metatag context, Presson and
Barney note that, except in the case where the consumer arrives at the
defendant's web site under the misapprehension that she has come to
the plaintiffs site and remains so confused through the time that she
makes a purchase, 190 in the situation where any consumer confusion
that existed during the results list stage has been cleared up before a
purchase decision has been made, a cause of action should not exist. 19 1
After noting that there may be cause to treat competitive, "discrete"
uses of others' trademarks as metatags differently from "hit-seeking,"
"indiscriminate" uses, 192 the authors set their sights on exposing "The
Information Super Highway" as an "unfortunate moniker." 19 3 Noting
184. See id. at 167.

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Presson & Barney, supra note 170 at 168-69.
188. Id. at 169.
189. Id.
190. In this situation, the authors would find liability for trademark infringement reasonable. Id. at 170.
191. See id.
192. Presson & Barney, supra note 170 at 170-72 (suggesting that "discrete" uses should
be treated more leniently).
193. Id. at 173-74.

20001

HALVE THE BABY

that highway analogies are now omnipresent in the Internet context, the
authors take issue with the suggestion that because the hypothetical
owners of a small bed and breakfast would not be allowed to erect a
"Sheraton" billboard by the side of the highway, they should not be able
to place "Sheraton" in their web site's "Keywords" metatags:
While technically correct, this analogy is not inclusive of all the
possible legitimate uses that a bed and breakfast owner could make of a
trademark metatag. For instance, why is it necessarily true that the
insertion of the term "SHERATON (R)" in the bed and breakfast
owner's Web site is equivalent to saying, "this way to the Sheraton"? It
could also be interpreted to mean: (1) "if you are interested in the
SHERATON (R), we have cheaper rates;" or (2) "our bed and breakfast
is located just minutes from the SHERATON (R);" or (3) "if the SHERATON (R) is full, try us;" or (4) "three out of four travelers prefer us to the
SHERATON (R)." Likewise, the bed and breakfast owner could simply
erect his billboard right next to SHERATON (R)'s billboard (zoning laws
permitting) so that drivers would be forced to look at both signs at the
same time. All of these would be considered legitimate forms of comparative advertising and as such are encouraged under FTC policy. 194
The stark contrast between this thoughtful analysis and
O'Scannlain's mechanical application of the highway analogy in Brookfield 19 5 cannot be missed.
In their final analysis, Presson and Barney stress the familiar mantra "that confusion, not competition, is the touchstone of trademark infringement." 19 6 The authors caution against a per se rule prohibiting
the use of others' trademarks as metatags,19 7 and argue that
In a situation in which a competitor distinguishes its Web site from
a trademark owner's Web site, it would be unfair to limit consumer
choice in selecting goods on the Internet to only well-known products.
This practice would preclude a lesser known vendor from exposure to
potential purchasers, who may actually be seeking the lesser-known
198
vendor's goods.
VI.

THE SOLUTION: A "TRADEMARKS" METATAG

Presson and Barney would allow web site owners to use others'
trademarks as metatags so long as the non-holder of the trademark
194. Id. (footnote omitted).
195. See supra text accompanying note 84.
196. Id. at 176 (quoting Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir.
1987)).
197. See id. at 177. Had they forseen it, it is quite likely the authors would also have
cautioned against the application - adopted by the Brookfield court - of "initial interest
confusion" to the trademark-metatag issue, as such a standard comes extremely close to
serving as a de facto prohibition.
198. Id.
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"distinguishe[d] its Web site from [the] trademark owner's Web site."199
Gasparek asserts that the fair use defense can carry the necessary water
in this field, "as long as the court[s] can easily identify good faith and
lack of consumer confusion." 20 0 My suggestion is that the way to satisfy
both of these interests is to encourage the widespread implementation of
a "Trademarks" metatag.
The standard utilization of a "Trademarks" metatag to complement
the established "Keywords" metatag would allow the source-identification purpose of trademarks as metatags to be separated from their functional descriptive purpose. In so doing, it would create the possibility for
simple, bright-line rules. The proposal this article offers is that within
the "Trademarks" metatag a company would be allowed to list any and
all terms in which it holds trademark rights and none in which it does
not. The corollary of such a rule would be that the "Keywords" metatag
could then be utilized by all web site owners to list those trademarks
that they felt were in some way descriptive of the content of their sites,
whether or not they held any rights in the trademarked terms, without
fear that they would be perceived as infringing upon or diluting others'
20 1
trademarks.
The reason why this disaggregation of the functions currently served
by trademarks as "Keywords" metatags would be salubrious is that it
would allow consumers to make their preferences known more clearly to
the search engines they use to navigate the Internet. For example, in
the her second Welles opinion, Judge Keep noted that "both parties' experts agree, that an 'appreciable number' of people who plug in one of
Plaintiffs trademark terms into a web browser search engine are 'look199. Id.
200. Gasparek, supra note 164 at 823.
201. This arrangement would abrogate the necessity of relying on "initial interest confusion" in the trademark-metatag context. The "initial interest confusion" standard is a
tricky one to apply, and does not mesh perfectly with the realities of cyberspace. As Judge
Keep noted,
[olther courts cited by the Brookfield court which acknowledged initial interest
confusion as being actionable under the Lanham Act have indicated that other
factors are relevant in a finding of a confusing trademark use, or infringement.
Among these are: (1) evidence of the initial interest confusion as being 'damaging
and wrongful,' Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F.Supp. 836, 844
(W.D.Pa.1981); (2) evidence that confusion between two products 'will mistakenly
lead the consumer to believe there is some connection between the two and therefore develop an interest in the [defendant's] line that it would otherwise not have,'
Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1167, 1180 (N.D.N.Y.1995); or
(3) evidence that the 'situation offers an opportunity for sale not otherwise available by enabling defendant to interest prospective customers by confusion with the
plaintiffs product.' See also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 1992 WL
436279, at *24 (W.D.N.C. Dec.1, 1992).
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1094.
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ing for Playboy's official site.'" 20 2 Obviously, it is also true that some
number of "people who plug in one of [PEI]'s trademark terms into a web
browser search engine" are not searching for PEI's official site. That is,
some web surfers who enter "Playboy" into their search engine of choice
are looking specifically for the official PEI site; while others are simply
looking for pictures of naked women and using "Playboy" as a logical
proxy. As Judge Keep noted:
In rendering an analysis which is flexible and reflective of "emerging
technologies," this court is also mindful that it must not lose sight of
either common sense or the important, foundational and underlying
principles of trademark law. Finding that Ms. Welles' use of PEI's
trademarked terms in the metatags of her website is a fair use comports
with the fact web users must utilize identifying words to find their intended site. Not all web searches utilizing the words "Playboy," "Playmate," and "Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981" are intended to find
20 3
"Playboy"goods or the official "Playboy"site.
Adding a "Trademarks" metatag to complement the "Keywords"
metatag would allow both sets of web surfers to find their intended sites.
For example, after entering "Playboy" into her favorite search engine,
the surfer would then have the option of checking the search engine's
"Trademarks Only" box before submitting her query request, and thus
being fairly certain that his results list would contain only links to PEI's
official site(s), 20 4 or leaving the box unchecked and thus availing herself
to a much larger results list that would contain non-PEI sites that
wished to be considered by surfers who searched for "Playboy" not as a
trademark, but as a descriptor.
As a means for encouraging compliance with this new standard,
either Congress could create a cause of action for any company whose
trademarked terms are used as "Trademarks" metatags in sites whose
owners do not also hold rights in those terms, or courts could evaluate
the actions of alleged trademark misusers in light of whether the appropriated terms were listed as "Keywords" metatags or "Trademarks"
metatags, with a much harsher test presented to defendants who listed
20 5
others' trademarked terms in their "Trademarks" section.
202. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
203. Id. at 1095 (emphasis added).
204. Note that as terms can be trademarked by different companies in different lines of
products, it is possible that the surfer searching for sites with a "Playboy" trademark only
might find links returned to, e.g., "Playboy Golf Clubs" or "Playboy Toner Cartridges," as
well as to PEI's official site(s).
205. The only viable defenses in such a situation would be (1) the defendant has a valid
trademark in the term; and (2) the defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that he
had a valid common law trademark right in the term.
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CONGRESS SHOULD CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

Obviously, one way to kickstart the implementation of a "Trademarks" metatag would be for Congress to create a cause of action for
companies whose trademarked terms are used as "Trademarks"
metatags in sites whose owners do not also hold rights in the terms.
Because of the greater flexibility, vis-&-vis the courts, that Congress
possesses in dealing with emerging legal issues, this article suggests
that a congressionally created cause of action would be the superior alternative for giving force to "Trademarks" metatags. Congress could establish either that such improper use would lead to liability with
standard tort damages, or it could create a scheme of statutory damages.
Congress could also assign to the evaluation of trademark-metatag infringement claims to adjudicatory bodies other than the courts. Finally,
Congress could specifically limit the right of trademark licensing in this
context.
1.

A Scheme of Statutory Damages Should Be Established

Due to the problems of proof bound to arise in any attempt to evaluate tort damages based on a claim of metatag-trademark infringement,
the suggestion offered here is that a statutory scheme be enacted. Variables to consider in establishing a matrix of statutory damages would be:
the absolute number of infringing "Trademarks" metatags employed by
the defendant, the length of time these metatags existed on the defendant's web site(s), the strength of the infringed trademark(s), and the defendant's reactions to any cease-and-desist letters issued by the plaintiff.
2.

ICANN Dispute Resolution ProceduresCould Be Incorporated

In addition to presenting the possibility for statutory damages, one
other way in which a congressionally created cause of action would be
superior to the alternative of industry adoption coupled with judicial
evolution is that Congress could assign the evaluation of these claims to
adjudicators other than the courts. One obvious possibility would be the
creation of a new administrative agency to handle the adjudication of
trademark-metatag claims. Perhaps a better option would be to create a
very focused tribunal within the Patent and Trademark Office.
Quite possibly the best alternative, though, would be to piggyback
on the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers' "Uniform
Dispute Resolution Process," which is currently serving to provide the
framework for resolving controversies over rights to Internet domain
names. 20 6 As the ICANN-certified arbiters are already familiar with the
206. See Jeri Clausing, Wrestling Group Wins Back Use of Its Name on Internet, N.Y.
TiMES, January 17, 2000, at C4.
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intersection of trademark law and the Internet, albeit in a slightly different context, and as they can resolve these relatively straightforward oneissue disputes far more expeditiously and economically than can the judiciary, 20 7 it would seem ideal to put ICANN's talents to use in evaluating trademark-metatag claims.
3.

Trademark Owners Should Not Be Permitted To License the Use of
Their Trademarked Terms as "Trademarks"Metatags to Others

While the licensing of trademarked terms from the trademark owners to other companies is generally permitted, 20 8 it should be prohibited
in this context. The necessity of this constraint becomes apparent as
soon as one considers that different companies in different industries are
permitted to trademark the same term, and that cross-licensing of trademarked terms between companies in separate industries could thus
make the gains from establishing a "Trademarks" metatag illusory.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical cross-licensing arrangement
between American Airlines and United Van Lines. When, in our world
with "Trademarks" metatags, a consumer enters "United" into her favorite search engine and checks the "Trademarks Only" box because she is
searching specifically for United Airlines' official site, it is bad enough
that her results list is bound to contain United Van Lines' site; it would
be simply ridiculous if it also contained American Airlines' site.
B.

ALTERNATIVELY, WEB SITE DEVELOPERS AND COURTS COULD

COLLABORATE

To

CREATE A NEW STANDARD

In the event that Congress does not act in the manner recommended
above, a second-best solution could still be effectuated by the combination of industry adoption of the "Trademarks" metatag and judicial recognition of its significance. Widespread use of the "Trademarks"
metatag would allow courts to move beyond the fuzzy and ill-fitting "initial interest confusion" standard and establish bright-line rules that
would both enhance consumers' ability to find the web sites they desire
and provide courts and web site developers with clear boundaries between the permissible and the impermissible.
1.

Courts Should Focus on the "Use as Trademark"Element of the
Fair Use Defense in Evaluating Trademark-Metatag Claims

Since adding a "Trademarks" metatag to the "Keywords" metatag
already widely used would allow for the disaggregation of the two func207. See id. (noting that the decision "was handed down in 40 days - at a cost of a
$1,000 ffling fee plus lawyers' fees for the wrestling federation.").
208. McCARTHY,supra note 9, §3.04.
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tions trademarked terms serve in the metatag context - source identification and site description - courts should focus their inquiries in
trademark-metatag claims on whether plaintiffs' trademarked terms
were indeed used as trademarks in determining whether or not to find
liability in defendants. That the "Trademarks" section of a site's
metatags would be architecturally distinct from its "Keywords" section
would obviously ease this inquiry.
2.

An Improper Use in the "Trademarks"Section of a Site's Metatags
Would Be Clear Evidence of Infringement

The placing of a term in the "Trademarks" metatags section of a web
site would present dispositive evidence that the site owner meant to use
the term as a trademark. Once a plaintiff is able to show (1) that it holds
a valid trademark right in the term at issue and (2) that the defendant
has listed the term within the "Trademarks" section of the defendant's
web site's metatags, the only question before the court would be whether
or not the defendant also holds (or possibly, whether the defendant reasonably and in good faith believes that it holds) a valid trademark in the
term at issue.
Since willfulness would be established by the very act of placing a
term within the "Trademarks" section, if the defendant were not able to
prove its trademark rights in the mark (or at least its good faith and
reasonable belief that it held such rights), it would then be liable for
20 9
damages.
3.

Concomitantly, Use in the "Keywords" Section of a Site's Metatags
of Any Term, Whether Trademarked by Another or Not, Should
Be Permitted

Particularly in those cases where the defendant has created a
"Trademarks" metatags section and does not list the plaintiffs trademarked term(s) within that section, use of the terms in the defendant's
"Keywords" metatags section should be allowed. Once the "description"
function of the trademarked terms has been effectively separated from
their "source identification" function by the introduction of the "Trademarks" metatag, there is simply no reason to prohibit a web site owner
from using another's trademarks not as trademarks, but as descriptors.
Allowing web site owners to use others' trademarked terms as
descriptors would mean that the web surfer who, for example, enters
"Playboy" into her favorite search engine as a proxy for "naked women"
to see the broad results list he desires. This result would obviously be
good for the consumer. And trademark law is, after all, meant to protect
209. The defendant would, of course, also be enjoined from continuing to use the mark
within its "Trademarks" metatags.

HALVE THE BABY
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her from confusion, not to limit the scope of available products to which
he can find reference.
VII.

ANTICIPATED MARKET REACTIONS TO THE
"TRADEMARKS" METATAG

The introduction of a legally significant "Trademarks" metatag will
produce subtle but important shifts in the way the Internet search market operates. First, search engines will adjust their algorithms to take
into account the new metatag. Second, they will offer to web surfers the
option of narrowing their searches such that the search engine would
seek only to match the consumer-entered search terms with "Trademarks" metatags. The direct result of these refinements would be that
the web surfing public would be able to request searches in such a manner that the results lists returned would be more specifically tailored to
their individual tastes.
A.

SEARCH ENGINES WILL ADJUST THEIR ALGORITHMS AND OFFER
"TRADEMARKS ONLY" OPTIONS

There are literally dozens of serious entrants in the hyper-competitive search engine market. 2 10 With the exception of www.iwon.com,
which gives away cash prizes to its users as a marketing tool, 2 1 1 these
search engines are competing for eyeballs, and thus advertising income,
solely on the elements of ease of use and accuracy of results. At this
stage in their evolution, ease of use does not vary much from one search
engine to the next. Accuracy of results is therefore the key competitive
concern of Internet search engine owners.
If a "Trademarks" metatag were to acquire legal significance, and
thus offer the potential for simply creating more narrowly tailored
searches, the search engines would react at the speed of the Internet.
First, they would likely afford more weight in their "standard" searches
to "Trademarks" metatags than to "Keywords" metatags. 212 Second,
they would offer click-the-box options for the consumer who is really
seeking just the official PEI site to differentiate herself from the surfer
who has entered "Playboy" as a stand-in for "naked women."
210. See Danny Sullivan, The Major Search Engines and Directories,(visited Mar. 19,
2000) <http://www.searchenginewatch.com/inks/Major-Search-_Engines/
TheMajorSearchEngines/index.html>.
211. See id.
212. For example, "Playboy" listed once in the "Trademarks" section of a web site's
metatags would trump 1000 "Playboy"s in the "Keywords" section of another site's
metatags.
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CONSUMERS WILL BE ABLE TO GET THE RESULTS LISTS THEY

REALLY WANT

The readily apparent outgrowth of any kind of refinement on the
part of search engines is the ability of web surfers to perform more perfect searches. Since the establishment of a legally-significant "Trademarks" metatag would eventually lead to the ability of consumers to
specify whether they are using search terms as trademarks or merely as
descriptors, and since such designations would in turn prompt the return
of more individually tailored results lists, the creation and utilization of
a "Trademarks" metatag would have obvious benefits for the web surfing
public.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The use of the "Keywords" metatags has presented a legal issue with
which the courts will continue to grapple. Thus far, it appears that
2 13
courts are prone to err on the side of overprotecting trademark rights.
This trend is likely to continue, perhaps even to accelerate, in light of
Judge O'Scannlain's application of "initial interest confusion" to the
trademark-metatag context. 2 14 The fallout from this overprotection will
be that consumers who are entering trademarked terms into search engines as proxies for the generic descriptive qualities that those terms exemplify to the consumers 2 15 will receive less inclusive results lists than
they would desire.
The creation and utilization of a "Trademarks" metatag would serve
a number of purposes. First, it would allow for the creation of bright-line
rules defining for adjudicators and web site developers what is and what
is not permissible with regard to the use of others' trademarked terms in
metatags. Second, these clear rules would make possible subtle but significant search engine evolution. Finally, and most importantly, the improved search engines would allow the web surfing public easier access
to more specifically tailored results lists in response to their Internet
search queries.

213. See supra Part IV.
214. See supra Part 1V.G.
215. For example, a consumer using "Playboy" to stand in for "naked women" would not
be using "Playboy" in its trademark sense.

